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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Summary
There exists a significant amount of heterogeneity in terms of the intensity with which workers
search for jobs.1 Understanding the sources and implications of this heterogeneity is important
because many of the active labor market policies that we observe aim at increasing job search
intensity. Examples include (i) unemployment sanctions, like cuts in the benefits paid to the
unemployed who do not engage in active job search (see Abbring et al., 2005), (ii) counseling
and monitoring, like advising long term unemployed workers on how to draft application letters
(see van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2006), (iii) financial aids, like subsidizing child care
in order to increase the number of actively searching workers (see Heckman, 1974; Graham
and Beller, 1989), or (iv) re-employment bonus schemes (see Meyer, 1996). The evaluation of
policy programs of this kind is not easy because, on the one hand, it is difficult to measure job
search intensity directly and, on the other hand, a change in the search effort of the treatment
group affects the wage distribution and matching rates for the non-treated workers as well so
the general equilibrium effects can be substantial. In this paper, we calibrate the primitive
parameters of an equilibrium search model with endogenous search intensity and free entry
of vacancies. Those primitives are the search cost distribution, the value of home production
and the capital cost of vacancy creation. The calibrated values can then be used to calculate
the socially optimal search intensities and level of labor market tightness.
Specifically, we consider a discrete-time dynamic labor market with a continuum of iden-
tical, infinitely-lived workers and free entry of vacancies. Firms enter the market and post
wages to maximize profits. At each point in time, workers are either employed at one of the
firms or unemployed. Employed workers stay in their job until their match with the firm is
destroyed by some exogenous shock and they become unemployed again. Unemployed workers
search for jobs. Since search intensity is the policy parameter of interest, we explicitly model
it as the number of jobs workers choose to apply for. For each application submitted, a worker
incurs a search cost. This cost captures the necessary effort a worker has to exert in order to
successfully apply to a vacancy and possibly generate an offer, such as finding the vacancy,
learning about the firm, writing an application letter, and preparing for a potential interview.
Since workers differ in their ability to find job opportunities and to generate offers, we assume
that search costs differ amongst workers and are drawn from a common non-degenerate cumu-
lative distribution function (cdf). As in Gautier and Moraga-González (2005) (who consider
a one-period version of this model with identical workers), wages, the number of applications,
and firm entry are jointly determined in a simultaneous-moves game. For the usual reasons,
as explained in Burdett and Judd (1983) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998), firms play mixed
1See Bloemen (2005), Lammers (2008) and van der Klaauw et al. (2003).
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strategies and offer wages from a continuous wage offer distribution. In our model, equally
productive workers earn different wages because of three reasons: (i) some workers have low
search costs so, everything else equal, they are better at generating wage offers than high
search cost workers, (ii) for a given search cost, some workers receive more job offers than
others, and (iii) for a given number of job offers, some receive a better best-offer than others.
Rather than assuming an exogenous specification for a matching function (see the summary
of empirical studies in Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), the matching process is not only
endogenously determined by the firms’ and workers’ participation decisions, but also by the
search efforts of heterogeneous workers. Therefore, in our model, the primitive parameters
are not the elasticities of an exogenously specified matching function but the quantiles of the
search cost distribution. As in Albrecht et al. (2006), our aggregate matching function is based
on micro-foundations and determined by the interplay between two coordination frictions: (i)
workers do not know where other workers send their job applications and (ii) firms do not know
which workers other firms make employment offers to. These two frictions operate in different
ways for different distributions of worker search intensities and have implications on wage
determination and firm entry. The empirical distribution of search intensities in combination
with our theoretical model gives the distribution of marginal benefits of search. Since a worker
continues to send applications till the marginal benefits of search equal the marginal cost, we
can use this optimality condition to retrieve the magnitude of search costs for a given search
intensity.
To illustrate the difference between our model and models where either the wage distri-
bution or search intensity is exogenous, consider the effects of a policy intervention such as
an increase in the minimum wage. A priori, this policy makes search more attractive so one
would expect all workers to search harder after the shock. In our model, however, very in-
tensive search will be discouraged because the wage distribution becomes more compressed.
Consequently, the matching rate, the job offer arrival rate and the wage distribution are not
policy invariant. Moreover, the way these endogenous variables respond to policy changes
depends on the primitive search cost distribution.
The various policies mentioned above can be interpreted in this framework as aiming at
either changing the marginal benefits of search and or the distribution of search costs. For
example, one goal of subsidizing child care is to reduce the fraction of the labor force that does
not search at all, while counseling unemployed workers is likely to lower the cost of writing
effective application letters and increase the mean number of job applications. Besides policies
that aim to directly affect search intensity, redistribution policies like UI insurance, sanctions
and minimum wages also affect search intensity indirectly. Without a suitable framework there
is no way we can tell whether we should stimulate search intensity for all workers, only for
particular groups or not at all.
We calibrate our model to the Dutch labor market. We find that, in the decentralized
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market equilibrium, too few workers search, while the workers who search on average send
too many job applications. The first result can be explained by a standard hold-up problem.
Workers typically receive only part of the social benefits of their investments in search and
therefore workers with high search cost invest too little in search. The second result on
excessive search of the low-search cost workers is due to congestion externalities and rent
seeking behavior. Submitting more applications increases the expected maximum wage offer,
but workers do not internalize the fact that sending more applications increases the probability
that multiple firms consider the same candidate. A final source of inefficiency lies in the entry
decisions of vacancies. Given the search and participation strategies of the workers, too few
firms enter the market. Quantitatively, our results indicate that the three sources of inefficiency
together lead to a market surplus which is approximately 10% lower than in the social optimum.
We show that this number is approximately two thirds of the total welfare loss compared to
the Walrasian equilibrium and that it is robust to various alternative specifications of our
model.
Interestingly, these results suggest that the introduction of a moderate binding minimum
wage can be desirable for two reasons: (i) it increases participation in search because the ex-
pected wage increases; and (ii) it weakens the rent-seeking motive to send multiple applications
because it compresses the wage distribution. Those effects can also be reached by increasing
both UI benefits and the sanctions for workers who do not search.
The paper is organized as follows. After discussing the related literature below, we in-
troduce the model in section 2. Section 4 shows how the distribution of search costs can be
calibrated using the empirical distribution of searches. In section 5, we analyze efficiency by
comparing the socially optimal allocation with the market equilibrium. Section 6 provides a
discussion and 7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to multiple strands of literature. From a theoretical point of view, our
model is similar to the non-sequential search model of Burdett and Judd (1983), in which—
using labor market terminology—wage dispersion arises because some workers get multiple
job offers while others do not. As in Gautier and Moraga-González (2005), we model job
offers as the outcome of a micro-founded process in which workers initiate contact by sending
applications and some applications do not result in offers. We extend the model of Gautier
and Moraga-González (2005) to an infinite horizon and by introducing heterogeneity in search
costs. While various papers have analyzed models in which workers send multiple applications
simultaneously, e.g. Albrecht et al. (2006), Gautier and Wolthoff (2009), Galenianos and
Kircher (2009), Kircher (2009), Wolthoff (2014), these papers all maintain the assumption
that workers are homogeneous with respect to their search cost, making them unsuitable for
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studying distributions of search intensities.2
From an empirical point of view, we contribute to the literature that confronts search
models with the data. Most of this literature is based on (variations of) the models by Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002, 2004), which treat the process by
which workers and firms meet as a black box. Instead, we consider a fully micro-founded
model which makes it possible to analyze how this meeting process is affected by changes
in the environment or policy. To our knowledge, there does not exist previous work using
a labor market version of the Burdett and Judd (1983) model with rationing as in Gautier
and Moraga-González (2005), which is what we do here and which allows us to analyze the
importance of congestion externalities.
2 Model
Environment. We consider the steady state of a discrete-time labor market. The labor
market is populated by a measure 1 of workers and a positive measure of firms, determined
by a free entry condition. Both firms and workers are risk-neutral and discount the future at
a factor 11+r . Each worker supplies one indivisible unit of labor and each firm requires one
such unit of labor to produce output. At any given point in time, a worker is therefore either
employed by one of the firms or unemployed, while a firm is either matched with one of the
workers or has a vacancy.
Timing. Each period starts with a measure 1− u of existing matches, formed in one of the
previous periods, and a measure u of unemployed workers. The interaction between workers
and firms within a period takes place in a number of phases. First, there is vacancy creation
during the entry phase. Unemployed workers apply to one or more of these vacancies during
the search phase. Simultaneously, agents produce output in the production phase. In the last
phase, some of the existing matches are destroyed and new matches are formed.
Entry. At the beginning of each period, new firms can enter the market by creating a
vacancy. The vacancy creation cost equals k > 0 and entry will take place until the expected
payoff from vacancy creation equals zero. We denote the equilibrium number of vacancies by
v > 0.
Search. In the search phase, each of the u unemployed workers learns his search cost c, which
is a random draw from a common distribution S (c) with support on [0,∞). By paying the
2To highlight the novel element in our model, we keep the model stylized and abstract from other sources
of wage dispersion, such as heterogeneity in workers’ reservation wages (as in Albrecht and Axell, 1984) or on-
the-job search, potentially combined with firm heterogeneity (see e.g. Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Bontemps
et al., 2000; Mortensen, 2003).
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search cost, a worker can send an application to a random vacancy.3 Since a worker does not
learn the result of an application until the matching phase, he may have an incentive to send
multiple applications as long as his search cost c is sufficiently low (see Morgan and Manning,
1985). Sending several applications at a time reduces the risk of remaining unmatched and
increases the chance of getting a juicy offer.
We denote by a(c) the number of applications a worker with search cost c sends out,
incurring a total cost equal to C (a) = ca (c), and assume throughout that at least some workers
send more than 1 application.4 For computational reasons, we will impose a maximum, A, on
the number of applications that a worker can send in any given period, but as A can be an
arbitrarily large but finite integer, this restriction is rather weak.
Production. Agents produce output during the production phase. Existing matches be-
tween workers and firms create output with value y > 0. From this output, the firm pays the
worker his wage w and keeps the remainder, y − w.
Home Production and Unemployment Benefits. Unemployed workers receive a payoff
that consists of two components: the economic value h of their home production (or leisure)
and unemployment benefits B (a). The level of unemployment benefits may depend on the
worker’s search behavior, to capture the fact that—in most OECD countries—workers may
face a partial loss of benefits if they do not actively search for a job. We assume that B (a)
takes the following form
B (a) =
(1− pi) b for a = 0,b for a ∈ {1, . . . , A} ,
where b is the default level of benefits and pi ∈ [0, 1] is the expected penalty for lack of search
effort.
Separation. After production is completed, a fraction δ ∈ [0, 1] of the existing matches
experience a job destruction shock. The workers affected by the shock flow back to unemploy-
ment. We assume that these workers must experience at least one period of unemployment.
That is, they can only search for a job again in the next period.5
3In our model, we regard the cost of search as the necessary effort a worker has to exert in order to
successfully apply to a vacancy and possibly generate an offer. This effort is nontrivial and includes the time
spent on locating suitable vacancies, gathering all necessary documents to apply, drafting attractive application
letters, filling in forms, preparing for the interview, etc.
4We relax the linearity of C (a) in section 5.
5This assumption is standard in discrete-time models and not crucial for our results. It merely simplifies
expressions somewhat by ruling out multiple transitions between employment states within the same time
period.
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Matching. Once job applications have been received by the vacancies, each vacancy receiv-
ing at least one application randomly selects a candidate and rejects all other applicants.6
The firm makes a wage offer w to the selected candidate. Workers that receive one or more
wage offers accept the highest one as long as it is higher than their endogenously determined
reservation wage wR. Other wage offers are rejected, after which a new period starts.
We denote a worker’s matching probability by mW and a firm’s matching probability by
mF . Aggregate consistency requires thatmF = uvmW , while the steady state condition implies
that
u =
δ
δ +mW
. (1)
3 Market Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium of the model outlined above. We start by
deriving expressions for the equilibrium queue length and distribution of the number of job
offers. Subsequently, we describe workers’ application and job offer acceptance decisions. We
conclude the equilibrium analysis by characterizing firms’ entry and wage offer decisions.
3.1 Queue Lengths and Job Offers
Application Distribution. Because of the heterogeneity in the search cost c, workers will
differ in the number of applications a (c) that they send. To keep notation succinct, it will be
convenient to define the probability mass function pa, for a ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , A}, representing the
fraction of unemployed workers sending a applications in equilibrium. Our assumption that
some workers send more than one application then corresponds to 1− p0 − p1 > 0.
Queue Length. Since search is random, all firms are equally likely to receive applications
from the unemployed workers. This implies that the queue length, i.e. the expected number of
applications per vacancy, is equal to the total number of applications divided by the number
of vacancies:
λ =
u
v
A∑
a=1
apa. (2)
Job Offer Probability. Due to the infinite size of the labor market, the number of ap-
plications a specific vacancy receives follows a Poisson distribution with mean equal to the
queue length λ.7 Likewise, the number of competitors that a worker faces at a given firm
6By allowing firms to approach one candidate, we follow Albrecht et al. (2006) and Galenianos and Kircher
(2009). Other papers—e.g. Kircher (2009), Gautier and Holzner (2014), and Wolthoff (2014)—consider al-
ternative meeting technologies in which firms can approach multiple workers if necessary. Which meeting
technology is a more accurate description of real-life labor markets is still an open empirical question.
7Albrecht et al. (2004) and Albrecht et al. (2006) discuss the urn-ball matching technology with multiple
applications in detail.
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also follows a Poisson distribution with mean λ.8 In case an individual worker competes with
i other applicants for a job, the probability that the individual in question will get the job
equals 1/(1 + i). Therefore, the probability ψ that an application results in a job offer equals
ψ =
∞∑
i=0
1
i+ 1
e−λλi
i!
=
1
λ
(
1− e−λ
)
. (3)
Job Offer Distribution. Given a certain number of applications, the number of wage offers
that a worker receives then follows a binomial distribution. More precisely, for a worker who
sends a applications the probability χ (j|a) to get j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , a} job offers equals
χ (j|a) =
(
a
j
)
ψj (1− ψ)a−j .
We denote the fraction of unemployed workers that receive j job offers by qj . This fraction is
equal to the product of pa and the probability that these a applications result in exactly j job
offers, summed over all possible a:
qj =
A∑
a=j
χ (j|a) pa. (4)
Note that if a positive mass of workers sends a applications (i.e. pa > 0), then—by the
properties of the binomial distribution—the mass of workers receiving exactly j ∈ {0, . . . , a}
job offers (i.e. qj > 0) is also positive.
3.2 Workers’ Problem
Strategy. An unemployed worker’s strategy consists of two components: i) how many ap-
plications a (c) to send out, and ii) whether to accept the highest wage offer or reject it in
order to search again in the next period. As common in labor search models, workers will use
a threshold rule for the second component. That is, they will accept the highest wage offer if
and only if it exceeds their reservation wage, which we denote by wR.
Value of Employment. In order to derive a worker’s optimal strategy, we specify two
discrete-time Bellman equations. The first defines the expected discounted lifetime income
VE (w) of a worker who is employed at a wage w in the production phase of the current
period, i.e.
VE (w) = w +
1
1 + r
((1− δ)VE (w) + δVU ) , (5)
8See e.g. Lester et al. (2015), who call this property of the Poisson distribution “independence”.
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where VU denotes the value of unemployment. In words, the value of employment equals the
sum of the wage w and the discounted value of employment if the worker stays in the job in
the next period (with probability 1− δ) or the discounted value of unemployment if the match
with the firm gets destroyed (with probability δ).
Value of Unemployment. Unemployed workers face a trade-off when deciding how many
applications to send out. Applying to one more job is costly but it brings two sorts of benefits:
one, it reduces the probability of remaining unmatched and two, it increases the likelihood to
get a better paid job. Therefore, an unemployed worker with search cost c chooses the number
of applications a in such a way that she maximizes her expected discounted lifetime payoff
VU (a|c), which equals
VU (a|c) = h+B (a)−C (a)+ 1
1 + r
 a∑
j=1
χ (j|a)
ˆ ∞
0
max {VU , VE(w)} dF j (w) + χ (0|a)VU
 .
In words, the value of unemployment for a worker with search cost c who applies for a jobs
equals the sum of home production h, unemployment benefits B (a) and the expected dis-
counted payoff of his search strategy, net of search costs C (a) = ca. The applications result in
j wage offers with probability χ (j|a), each of which is a random draw w from the wage offer
distribution F , which we will derive below. In case of multiple offers, the worker accepts the
best one as long as that offer gives a higher payoff than remaining unemployed. If the worker
fails to find a job, he remains unemployed.
Given a search cost c, the optimal number of applications to send is a(c) = arg maxVU (a|c).
If we define VU (c) = maxa VU (a|c) = VU (a (c) |c), the (unconditional) value of unemployment
equals
VU =
ˆ ∞
0
VU (c)dS (c) . (6)
Reservation Wage. It is straightforward to show that the value of employment is strictly
increasing in w. Hence, workers will indeed use a threshold rule when deciding whether to
accept the highest wage offer or not. To derive the optimal threshold, i.e. the reservation wage
wR, it will be useful to define ζa as the expected wage in excess of wR for a worker who sends
a applications. That is,
ζa =
a∑
j=1
χ (j|a)
ˆ ∞
wR
(w − wR) dF j (w) =
ˆ ∞
wR
(w − wR) d (1− ψ + ψF (w))a , (7)
where the second equality follows from the binomial theorem.
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Note that wR must satisfy VE (wR) = VU . This implies
VU =
1 + r
r
wR
and
VE (w) =
1 + r
r + δ
(
w +
δ
r
wR
)
.
Using these equations and (7), the reservation wage wR then equals the fixed point of the
following equation,
wR = h+
ˆ ∞
0
max
a
(
B (a) +
1
r + δ
ζa − C (a)
)
dS (c) . (8)
This equation (8) satisfies the sufficient conditions for a contraction mapping as given by
Blackwell (1965). Therefore, a unique solution for the reservation wage wR exists.
Number of Applications. Using integration by parts, it is straightforward to establish
that the function ζa is monotonically increasing in a. Therefore, the workers’ maximization
problems induce a partition of the support of the search cost distribution as follows. In
equilibrium, a worker sends another application as long as the marginal benefits are greater
than or equal to the marginal search cost c. There exists a cutoff value Γa which makes a worker
indifferent between sending out a and a − 1 job applications, i.e. VU (a|Γa) = VU (a− 1|Γa),
for all a. From the expressions above, it follows that Γa is equal to
Γa =

1
r+δ ζ1 + pib for a = 1,
1
r + δ
(ζa − ζa−1) for a ∈ {2, . . . , A} .
(9)
It is straightforward to show that Γa is a decreasing function of a. This implies that workers
continue searching as long as Γa is larger than their search cost c. That is,
a (c) =

0 for Γ1 < c,
i for Γi+1 < c ≤ Γi
A for c ≤ ΓA.
and i ∈ {1, . . . , A− 1} ,
Hence, the fractions pa of workers sending a job applications satisfy the following conditions:
pa =

1− S (Γ1) for a = 0,
S (Γa)− S (Γa+1) for a ∈ {1, . . . , A− 1} ,
S (ΓA) for a = A.
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3.3 Firms’ Problem
Strategy. An unmatched firm makes two decisions, i.e. i) whether to enter the market by
creating a vacancy, and ii) which wage offer to make. The assumption of free entry implies
that the first decision is fairly trivial: firms will continue to enter the market until the value
of a vacancy equals zero. In order to derive the optimal wage offers, we again rely on Bellman
equations, after first establishing that the equilibrium must exhibit wage dispersion.
Wage Dispersion. A firm with a vacancy offers a randomly selected applicant a wage w.
In order to be attractive to both the firm and the applicant, this wage should be higher than
the applicant’s reservation wage wR, but lower than the value of the output y that will be
produced in case of a match. Within the interval [wR, y], the firm faces a trade-off: posting
a lower wage increases the firm’s payoff y − w conditional on matching, but it also increases
the probability that an applicant who receives multiple offers rejects the offer and chooses to
work for a different firm.
As in Burdett and Judd (1983) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998), wage dispersion must
arise in equilibrium because some applicants will compare multiple job offers while others
will not. Denote the equilibrium wage offer distribution by F (w) and its support by [w,w].
Because a worker has no other offers with strictly positive probability, the lower bound of the
support must be equal to the workers’ reservation wage, w = wR.
Value of a Match. A firm employing a worker has a periodical match payoff equal to y−w.
In the next period, the firm is still active with probability 1 − δ; otherwise it has a vacancy
again. In equilibrium, free entry implies that the lifetime expected payoff of a vacancy VV
equals zero. Hence, the firms’ value VF (w) of being matched with a worker earning a wage w
is given by
VF (w) = y − w + 1− δ
1 + r
VF (w) . (10)
Value of a Vacancy. A firm with a vacancy offering a wage w hires a worker with an
endogenously determined probability mF (w). In this case, the firm obtains a value VF (w) in
the next period. If the firm fails to match (with probability 1 −mF (w)), it receives VV = 0
in the next period. Hence, the value of a vacancy, conditional on offering a wage w, equals
VV (w) = −k + 1
1 + r
mF (w)VF (w) . (11)
Matching Probability. A firm planning to make a wage offer w successfully hires a worker
if and only if i) the firm has at least one applicant and ii) the applicant that the firm selects
receives either no other job offers or only offers paying less than w. In appendix A.1, we derive
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the following expression for the probability mF (w) of this event,
mF (w) =
u
v
S∑
j=1
jqjF
j−1 (w) . (12)
Wage Offer Distribution. The equilibrium wage offer distribution F (w) is determined by
an indifference condition: in equilibrium, each wage in the support of F must yield the same
expected payoffs to a firm. That is, F (w) is implicitly defined by the equation VV (w) =
VV (w), which after substitution of equation (10) and (12) reduces to
S∑
j=1
jqjF
j−1 (w) = q1
y − w
y − w. (13)
Evaluating (13) at the upper bound w, where F (w) = 1, gives :
w = y − q1∑S
j=1 jqj
(y − w) , (14)
which is strictly smaller than y, since q1 > 0. Hence, firms always post wages below the
productivity level. This is because a wage equal to y would give the firm a payoff of zero
with probability one, while posting a lower wage gives a strictly positive expected payoff, since
there is a positive probability that some applicants do not receive other offers.
Entry. Using (10) and (11) to rewrite the free entry condition VV (w) = 0, one obtains
0 = −k + 1
r + δ
u
v
q1 (y − w) . (15)
This expression implicitly determines the free-entry equilibrium number of vacancies v in the
market.9
4 Calibration
We apply the model to the Dutch labor market. Calibration or estimation of the model can
be performed in a variety of ways, depending on the data available. As shown in Hong and
Shum (2006), (partial) identification of the search cost distribution is possible using only the
cross-sectional wage distribution (in addition to aggregate labor market statistics), as workers
with lower search costs will in expectation earn higher wages. We followed that approach
in the working paper version (see Gautier et al., 2011); however, an obvious challenge to
this approach is that wage variation may stem from various other sources, like unobserved
9Recall that q1 depends on v.
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Table 1: Distributions of the Number of Applications (pa) and Job Offers (qj).
Data source: Bloemen (2005).
a, j pa qj
Data Calibration
0 0.359 0.359 0.833
1 0.163 0.162 0.134
2 0.115 0.121 0.026
3 0.093 0.090 0.005
4 0.071 0.068 0.001
≥5 0.199 0.200 0.000
productivity differences. In this version, we therefore follow a different, more direct approach,
using data regarding the number of applications that workers send.
Application Distribution. Information on the distribution of the number of applications
is provided by Bloemen (2005) on the basis of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel 1987/1988, a
household survey collected by Statistics Netherlands. In the survey, individuals who described
themselves as unemployed were asked to indicate the number of times they had applied for
a job in the previous two months. The distribution of responses, which is displayed in the
second column of Table 1, is censored at 5 applications. As we require information on the entire
application distribution, we identify pa for a ≥ 5 parametrically. It turns out that—conditional
on applying at least once—the (censored) empirical distribution can be approximated very well
by a (censored) geometric distribution, i.e. pa1−p0 = (1− α)
a−1 α. We jointly calibrate p0 and
α, which yields p0 = 0.359 and α = 0.253 (see Table 1, third column).10
Time Period. By using data on the number of applications from Bloemen (2005), we im-
plicitly set the period length equal to two months. While this is longer than the one-month
period length used in many papers that calibrate to the US labor market (e.g. Shimer, 2005),
it appears to be a reasonable choice for the Dutch labor market in the late eighties. In fact,
van Ours and Ridder (1992) suggest an even longer period length by documenting on the basis
of Dutch recruitment data from early 1987 that “almost all applicants arrive during the first 2
weeks after the announcement of the vacancy, and most vacancies are filled within the next 2.5
months, a period during which few new applicants arrive.” We fix the periodical interest rate
at r = 0.008, corresponding to an annual interest rate of 5% and set the maximum number of
10Recall that the model assumes that workers who send zero applications cannot match. While it is not
uncommon for labor force surveys to indicate that these workers may still find a job, this assumption is standard
in the search literature (see e.g. Pissarides, 1984; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Moen, 1997; Kircher, 2009;
Menzio and Shi, 2011).
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applications equal to one a day, i.e. A = 60.11
Labor Market Stocks and Flows. Statistics Netherlands reports that in 1988 of the 5.868
million individuals in the Dutch labor force, on average 5.378 million were employed and 0.490
million were unemployed (Statistics Netherlands, 2014). This implies u = 0.084.
Data from the OECD indicates that the median unemployment duration in the Netherlands
in 1988 was approximately one year (OECD, 2014). This corresponds to a matching rate of
mW = 0.167 per 2 months. In the equilibrium of our model, workers match as long as they
get at least one job offer, i.e. with probability
mW = 1− q0 = 1−
A∑
a=0
(1− ψ)a pa. (16)
Hence, mW = 0.167 requires that each application results in a job offer with probability
ψ = 0.082. The corresponding distribution qj of the number of job offers can be calculated
from (4) and is presented in the last column of Table 1. Most workers obtain either zero or
one job offer per period, but a small fraction receives multiple offers.
Equation (2) and (3) then jointly determine the measure of vacancies, yielding v = 0.017.
Aggregate consistency implies that a firm’s matching probability is equal to mF = uvmW =
0.806 per period. Finally, the steady state condition (1) requires the job destruction probability
to equal δ = 0.015.
Wage Distribution. The wage offer distribution F (w) is implicitly determined by equation
(13), which depends on qj , y and w. Given the distribution of job offers qj in Table (1) and
the normalization y = 1, only a value for w is still required. We obtain such a value by using
information on the labor share, which the OECD reports to be 0.709 for the Netherlands for
1988 (OECD, 2014).
The equivalent to the labor share in our model is the average accepted wage. Note that
the distribution of accepted wages, which we denote by G (w), differs from the distribution
F (w) of offered wages, because some workers can compare wage offers, making high wage
offers more likely to be accepted. In order to derive an expression for G (w), consider a worker
who receives j > 0 job offers. He will only accept a wage that is lower than some value w if
all his j job offers are lower than this value. As a result, the following relationship between
G (w) and F (w) holds:
G (w) =
∑S
j=1 qjF
j (w)
1− q0 . (17)
The average accepted wage then equals wavg =
´ w
w wdG (w) , which after substitution of (14)
11Note that p60 < 10−8, so this choice has no impact on our results.
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and (17) simplifies to a function of w alone, as we show in appendix A.2. This function can
be inverted to get the surprisingly simple expression
w = y − 1− q0
q1
(y − wavg) .
Equating wavg to 0.709 therefore yields w = 0.639 and, by equation (14), w = 0.766.12
Entry Cost. Using equation (15), we can write the entry cost k as a function of variables
for which we have obtained a value, i.e.
k =
1
r + δ
u
v
q1 (y − w) .
This yields k = 9.998. While this value may appear high, it is important to keep in mind that
firms—on average—incur the entry cost for only 2.5 months before enjoying the payoffs of a
match for more than 11 years.13
Unemployment Benefits. The maximum replacement rate for unemployment benefits was
70% in 1988. Various eligibility criteria, the finite duration of benefits and a maximum on the
insured wage suggest that the average replacement rate should be lower.14 At the same time,
data from Statistics Netherlands indicates that the Dutch government spent about 13,350
euros per unemployed worker in 2005, which corresponds to approximately 40% of the average
wage in that year (Statistics Netherlands, 2014). Similar data is unfortunately hard to obtain
for 1988, but as unemployment benefits became less generous between 1988 and 2005, 40%
seems a lower bound for the replacement rate. In line with these considerations, we set b equal
to 50% of wavg, which amounts to b = 0.355.15
Unemployment Sanctions. Abbring et al. (2005) document—on the basis of a number
of sources—that the most common sanction for lack of search effort is a 20 percentage point
decrease in the replacement rate for 13 weeks. Given a replacement rate of 50% and ignoring
discounting, this number is equivalent to a penalty of 60% during our two-month period.16
However, Abbring et al. (2005) argue that the number of sanctions is relatively small, which
suggests that monitoring is not perfect. In line with this, we set the expected penalty pi equal
to 10%.17
12Hence, our calibration implies a mean-min value of 0.709/0.639 = 1.110. See Hornstein et al. (2011) for a
detailed discussion of this statistic.
13We discuss some ways to obtain lower values of k in section 6.
14See Abbring et al. (2005) for a description of the Dutch unemployment benefit system.
15Other values of b do not lead to qualitatively different results.
1620%/50%× 13/(52/6) = 60%.
17Our qualitative results do not depend on this specific choice.
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Search Cost Distribution. Knowledge of the wage offer distribution and the application
distribution is sufficient to partially identify the search cost distribution. To see this, realize
that information on the wage offer distribution allows us to calculate ζa and Γa as defined in
(7) and (9), respectively. Since Γa+1 represents the marginal gains from sending a+ 1 rather
than a applications, the application distribution pa is informative of the mass of agents with
a search cost between Γa+1 and Γa. This procedure gives us A cutoff points (Γ1, ...,ΓA) of the
search cost distribution S (c). Figure 1 illustrates this idea.
For some purposes, e.g. for assessing the efficiency of the market equilibrium, we need the
full distribution (i.e. for every possible value of c). On the interval [0,Γ1], i.e. for all workers
who apply at least once, we obtain this by using linear interpolation between the cutoff points:
S (c) =
∑A
j=i+1 pj +
pi
Γi−Γi+1 (c− Γi+1) ∀c ∈ [Γi+1,Γi) and i = {1, ..., A} ,
where we define ΓA+1 = 0. This assumption is relatively weak as long as the cutoff points are
not too sparse.
Our calibration procedure provides no information on the search cost of workers who do
not apply, other than the fact that their search cost must exceed the marginal gain of a first
application, c > Γ1. Our baseline assumption will be that the search cost distribution keeps
increasing linearly for these values of c, with the same slope as just before Γ1, until it reaches
1. Hence, on this interval S (c) is given by
S (c) =
{
1− p0 + p1Γ1−Γ2 (c− Γ1) ∀c ∈ [Γ1,Γ0)
1 ∀c ≥ Γ0
, where Γ0 = Γ1 +
p0
p1
(Γ1 − Γ2) .
Admittedly, this assumption is rather strong, so we will consider two alternatives: i) all workers
who do not apply have infinite search costs, i.e. S (c) = 1 − p0 for all c ∈ [Γ1,∞); and ii) all
workers who do not apply have search costs (marginally higher than) Γ1, i.e. S (c) = 1 for all
c ∈ [Γ1,∞). These alternatives form an upper and a lower bound, respectively.
Figure 2 displays our search cost distribution. Weighted by the number of applications,
the average search cost of an unemployed worker is 0.167, i.e. approximately 17% of periodical
output or 24% of the average periodical wage.18
Home Production. Identification of the value of home production is possible from (8). As
we show in appendix A.3, this equation combined with the assumption of piecewise linearity
18This number is of course independent of any assumption about the search costs of workers who do not
search.
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Figure 1: Identification of the Search Cost Distribution.
For illustrative purposes, the figure shows a special case in which wR = 0 and A = 5.
The wage offer distribution F (w) determines the marginal benefits of search, Γa (panel
1). Workers choose their search intensity such that the marginal gain of an additional
application does not exceed the marginal cost (panel 2). Hence, the probability that
search costs are between Γa+1 and Γa equals pa (panel 3).
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Figure 2: Calibrated Search Cost Distribution
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of S (c) gives
h = wR − 1
r + δ
A∑
a=1
pa
(
ζa − 1
2
a (ζa+1 − ζa−1)
)
− b
(
1− pip0 − 1
2
pip1
)
,
where we define ζA+1 = ζA to simplify notation. This equation implies a value h = 0.220,
which is approximately 34% of the reservation wage.19
5 Planner’s Solution
Efficiency. An interesting policy issue is whether the decentralized market equilibrium is
efficient, i.e. are the search decisions by workers and the entry decisions by firms socially opti-
mal? A priori, there is no obvious answer to the question whether the number of applications
sent by workers in the market equilibrium is too high or too low from a social planner’s point
of view. On the one hand, workers might underinvest in search since they face a standard
hold-up problem: They only receive a part of the social benefits of their investments in search.
On the other hand, workers might also send too many applications, since they only take into
account their own expected payoff and ignore the congestion effects their applications cause
in the market.
The entry decisions of firms might form a last source of inefficiency. Albrecht et al. (2006)
show that when all workers search two or more times, efficient entry requires full ex ante and
full ex post (i.e. Bertrand) competition for workers. This is not the case in our model. There
is no full ex ante competition, since the firm that offers the lowest wage in the market receives
as many applications as the other firms, and there is no full ex post competition, because a
firm that offers the job to a worker with (an) other offer(s) still has a positive expected payoff.
Planner’s Objective and Constraints. To quantify these effects and analyze efficiency
of the market equilibrium, we consider the problem of a (constrained) social planner who—
starting from the above steady state—aims at maximizing the present discounted value of
future surplus (i.e., output, net of search and vacancy creation costs). We give the planner
access to two tools: he decides in each period i) how many vacancies are opened, and ii) how
many applications each worker sends.
With respect to the matching frictions, we distinguish two different cases. First, we consider
a social planner who is constrained in the sense that he cannot solve the coordination frictions
in the market. This type of planner faces the same matching function as the market, which
was given in equation (16). Second, we consider an unconstrained planner who can match
19The sum of home production and (expected) unemployment benefits then equals h+ (1− pip0) b = 0.562,
which is approximately halfway between the values of Shimer (2005) and Hall and Milgrom (2008).
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workers and firms in a Walrasian way. This type of planner generates a number of matches
that equals the minimum of the number of searchers and the number of vacancies:
m∗W =
1
u
min {u (1− p0) , v} .
Comparing outcomes under these two types of planner allows us to decompose the efficiency
loss in the market into a part that is directly due to frictions and a part that is due to distorted
incentives.
Recursive Formulation. As common in the literature, we express the problem in a recur-
sive way and in terms of the labor market tightness θ = vu instead of v (see e.g. Shimer, 2004;
Rogerson et al., 2005). Let V (u) be the expected present value of future surplus when the
current unemployment rate is u. Then, the following Bellman equation holds:
V (u) = max
a(c),θ
y (1− u) +
(
h−
ˆ ∞
0
a (c) cdS(c)− kθ
)
u+
1
1 + r
V
(
u′
)
, (18)
where u′ = δ (1− u) + (1−mW )u denotes unemployment in the next period. Note that the
unemployment benefits B (a) do not appear in (18) as they are assumed to be financed by
lump-sum taxation and are simply a form of redistribution. Using the values obtained above,
we can numerically solve this maximization problem and confront the market outcome with
the social optimum.
Constrained Planner’s Results. The third column of Table 2 presents the key parameters
of the constrained planner’s solution. We observe important differences relative to the market
equilibrium. First, the planner increases the number of searchers: unemployed workers who
were not applying should send one application instead. At the same time, the planner ends the
practice of sending multiple applications. Although almost half of all unemployed workers have
search costs low enough to make it privately optimal to apply multiple times, these workers fail
to take into account that this increases the probability that multiple firms consider the same
candidate, which is socially wasteful. Given the calibrated values of the entry and application
cost, the negative effect dominates and it is socially desirable that these workers only apply
once each period. Finally, the planner finds it optimal to increase labor market tightness θ.
As a result of these changes, unemployment decreases by approximately 4 percentage
points, relative to the market equilibrium. The increase in θ and the reduction in u almost
exactly offset each other, as revealed by the relatively small change in the number of vacan-
cies v. All together, the planner increases expected present value of future surplus (18) by
approximately 10% relative to the market.
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Table 2: Market Equilibrium and Planner’s Solution
Market Planner
constr. unconstr.
p0 0.359 0.000 0.000
p1 0.162 1.000 1.000
p2 0.121 0.000 0.000
p3 0.090 0.000 0.000
p4 0.068 0.000 0.000
p≥5 0.200 0.000 0.000
θ 0.140 0.347 1.000
u 0.084 0.045 0.015
v 0.017 0.015 0.015
mW 0.167 0.328 1.000
mF 0.806 0.944 1.000
Surplus 89.56 98.26 102.25
Gain 9.7% 14.2%
Unconstrained Planner’s Results. The last column of Table 2 presents the results for
the unconstrained planner. The optimal strategy resembles that of the constrained planner,
except that the unconstrained planner wants to increase the labor market tightness even more,
as the coordination frictions can be fully eliminated. Under this scenario, unemployment drops
to 1.5%, while the number of vacancies again does not change very much.20 In total, surplus
is now 14% higher than in the market equilibrium. Hence, roughly two thirds of the total
efficiency loss is caused by wrong incentives while the coordination frictions account for the
remaining one third. As the former inefficiency is easier to address with policy than the latter,
this result suggests that the welfare effects from well-designed labor market programs can be
substantial.
Bounds. To analyze to what extent our efficiency results depend on the linear extrapolation
of the search cost distribution for non-searchers, we solve the planner’s problem also for the
two alternative scenarios, in which all non-searchers are assumed to have the lowest possible
(c = Γ1) or the highest possible (c → ∞) search cost, respectively. This provides us with
an upper and a lower bound on the planner’s efficiency gain. Table 3 presents the results,
together with the baseline solution from table (2) to facilitate comparison.
The solution for c = Γ1 looks very similar to the baseline solution along all dimensions.
The solution for c→∞ differs a bit more. Most importantly, but not surprisingly, the planner
20Note that despite the absence of matching frictions, unemployment is not eliminated as workers who lose
their job have to wait until the next period before they can match again.
21
Table 3: Bounds on Planner’s Solution
Constrained Planner Unconstrained Planner
c→∞ Baseline c = Γ1 c→∞ Baseline c = Γ1
p0 0.359 0.000 0.000 0.359 0.000 0.000
p1 0.641 1.000 1.000 0.641 1.000 1.000
p2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p≥5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
θ 0.240 0.347 0.332 0.641 1.000 1.000
u 0.064 0.045 0.046 0.023 0.015 0.015
v 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
mW 0.223 0.328 0.316 0.641 1.000 1.000
mF 0.931 0.944 0.951 1.000 1.000 1.000
Surplus 97.08 98.26 98.91 101.77 102.25 102.47
Gain 8.4% 9.7% 10.4% 13.6% 14.2% 14.4%
does not want the non-searchers to apply even once in this case. Nevertheless, total surplus
again does not change much, implying that the overall bounds on the welfare gains from our
baseline case are relatively narrow.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some of our key assumptions and results, along with a few potentially
interesting extensions of our basic framework.
General Search Cost Functions. A first important assumption is that a worker’s total
search cost C (a) is linear in the number of applications that he sends. In real life, C (a) might
be concave if workers invest a lot of time in drafting the first application letter but spend less
time on the subsequent ones. Alternatively, C (a) might be convex if workers have easy access
to a small number of vacancies (e.g. via their network of friends and colleagues), but have to
search really hard to find other job openings. In general, various different shapes may coexist.
We therefore generalize our analysis in appendix B by assuming that, in each period,
each worker—instead of drawing a search cost c—independently draws a search cost function
C (a) from a given set C. We only impose two very weak restrictions on the search cost
functions in C: each feasible C (a) is (i) equal to zero for a = 0 and (ii) weakly increasing
in a. Despite this level of generality, we find that our baseline results are robust. First,
the welfare gains change only slightly. As we discuss in more detail in the appendix, this is
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because the changes in the calibrated values for the search costs and home production mostly
offset each other. Second, the main message remains that—given our endogenous matching
process—more workers should send a small number of applications.
Match-Specific Productivity. A second assumption is that all matches are equally pro-
ductive. Alternatively, one could allow productivity to be match-specific, e.g. by assuming
that only a fraction φ < 1 of the applicants (iid across all firm-worker pairs) has productivity
y, while the remaining applicants have productivity 0. Due to the way in which we calibrate
the model, using direct evidence on workers’ number of applications and matching probability,
this extension has no effect on the estimated search cost distribution. However, it increases the
number of vacancies v, lowers the entry cost k, and may increase the number of applications
that the planner wants workers to send. For example, φ = 0.5 roughly doubles the number of
vacancies (v = 0.032) and halves the entry cost (k = 4.99). Although the planner instructs
some workers to search twice in this case, our main message remains unchanged.21
Entry Cost. The baseline calibration resulted in a relatively high value for the entry cost
k. The reason for this is that relatively few firms enter the market, even though they match
quickly, capture a sizable fraction of the surplus, and remain matched for a long time. Although
the high value of k has limited impact on our results—only affecting the planner’s choice of
entry—it might be useful to consider what extensions of the model would yield a lower estimate.
Since we obtain a value for k from the free entry condition, anything that decreases the benefits
of opening a vacancy will reduce our estimate. Match-specific productivity, as described above,
is one example. Alternatively, introducing a cost of maintaining capital during the match or
firing costs, reduces firms’ match payoff. Allowing for on-the-job search would reduce the
expected match duration. We leave these extensions for future research.
Inefficiency. Our result that some workers search too little while other workers search too
much is—to the best of our knowledge—new in the literature. It is the result of two coun-
tervailing forces. On the one hand, workers capture only part of the match surplus, creating
a hold-up problem which causes them to search too little. On the other hand, they have an
incentive to send multiple applications in order to get a higher wage offer. From the planner’s
point of view, this rent-seeking behavior merely creates congestion externalities, which means
that workers might search too much.22 Which force dominates depends on a worker’s realiza-
tion of the search cost. This contrasts models like Pissarides (1984, 2000) in which all meetings
between workers and firms are bilateral and wages are determined by Nash bargaining. In that
21As data limitations prevent reliable identification of φ, we do not report these results in detail, but they
are available upon request.
22See Gautier and Moraga-González (2005) and Albrecht et al. (2006) for a detailed discussion.
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case, a worker’s choice of search intensity only affects how quickly he meets a firm and has no
effect on his wage. Hence, the incentive to engage in rent-seeking behavior disappears and the
natural result is that search intensity is always too low.
Gautier and Holzner (2014) argue that in a simultaneous search setting, as we use here,
wage determination and matching efficiency are not independent. They model the labor mar-
ket as a bipartite network, in which unemployed workers and vacancies are the nodes and
applications form the links. The wage mechanism then affects both the distribution of net-
works that can arise and the number of trades on a realized network. One important factor
is whether firms that fail to hire a candidate can move on to (‘recall’) the next candidate in
the same period. If this is the case, the congestion externalities are smaller and it is more
desirable that workers send out multiple applications. In Kircher (2009), firms can contact all
their applicants (full recall), while Wolthoff (2014) endogenizes this decision by introducing a
cost for each contact. Gautier and Holzner (2014) also have full recall and show that allowing
firms to change their wage offer after the network has been formed improves efficiency.
7 Conclusion
We present a discrete-time dynamic labor market model. Unlike most of the literature, we
explicitly define the search intensity as the number of applications that workers choose to send
out per period, taking into account the fact that each application is costly. As such, the model
provides a micro-founded framework for the evaluation of public policies intended to increase
job search intensity. We characterize the equilibrium and show how a relatively small amount
of aggregate data is sufficient to identify the model’s parameters, including the cross-sectional
distribution of search costs.
Taking the coordination frictions, the calibrated value of home production, and the cali-
brated search cost distribution as given, we then solve the problem of a (constrained) social
planner and find that, by choosing workers’ search decisions and firms’ entry decisions opti-
mally, the planner could achieve welfare gains up to 10%. We show how this value is robust
to various different specifications of the search costs. The planner’s solution indicates that in
the market equilibrium too many unemployed workers do not search at all. At the same time,
some unemployed workers send too many applications, in an attempt to get a very high wage
offer, but ignoring the negative externalities this imposes on others.
Our results suggest that labor market policies should aim at increasing search effort along
the extensive margin rather than the intensive margin. Interestingly, the introduction of higher
UI benefits or a moderate binding minimum wage could improve efficiency along both margins.
It would increase the gains from searching a small number of times by increasing the expected
wage offer, while lowering the gains from sending many applications by compressing the wage
distribution. We leave a quantitative analysis of the welfare gains of this kind of policies for
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future research.23
23Compared to other empirical equilibrium search models in the literature, we have modeled the matching
process and search intensity with a lot more detail, but in other respects our model is stylized. For example,
we abstract from risk-aversion, productivity differences across workers, persistent components in search costs,
or firms’ ability to make multiple offers in the same period, all of which may affect the optimal level of UI
benefits of the minimum wage.
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A Derivations
A.1 Firm’s Matching Probability
A firm matches if it offers its candidate a higher wage than all other firms competing for the
same worker. The probability for a firm to have at least one applicant with productivity y is
equal to 1−e−λ. The conditional probability that the candidate has sent a applications is given
by apa∑A
i=1 ipi
and the a−1 other applications of the candidate result in j ∈ {0, 1, ..., a− 1} other
job offers with probability χ (j|a− 1), which are all lower than w with probability F j (w).
Hence, the matching probability of a firm offering w is given by
mF (w) =
(
1− e−λ
) A∑
a=1
apa∑A
i=1 ipi
a−1∑
j=0
χ (j|a− 1)F j (w) .
By using 1 − e−λ = λψ = uv
∑A
i=1 ipiψ and the definition of χ (j|a− 1), we can simplify this
expression as follows
mF (w) =
u
v
A∑
a=1
apa
a−1∑
j=0
(
a− 1
j
)
ψj+1 (1− ψ)a−1−j F j (w)
=
u
v
A∑
a=1
a∑
j=1
apa
(
a− 1
j − 1
)
ψj (1− ψ)a−j F j−1 (w)
=
u
v
A∑
j=1
jqjF
j−1 (w) .
A.2 Lower Bound Wage Distribution
Substitution of (17) in the expression for wavg and applying a change of variables yields
wavg =
1
1− q0
ˆ 1
0
w (z) d
A∑
j=1
qjz
j ,
where, by inversion of (13),
w (z) = y − (y − w) q1∑S
j=1 jqjz
j−1 .
Hence,
wavg = y − q1
1− q0 (y − w)
or
w = y − 1− q0
q1
(y − wavg) .
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A.3 Home Production
Equation (8) implies
h = wR −
ˆ ∞
0
max
a
(
B (a) +
1
r + δ
ζa − ca
)
dS (c) (19)
To calculate the integral, partition the support of S (c) into the intervals [ΓA+1,ΓA), [ΓA,ΓA−1),
..., [Γ2,Γ1), [Γ1,Γ0], where ΓA+1 and Γ0 are the lower bound and the upper bound of the sup-
port of S (c). Due to the linear interpolation, the density s (c) is constant on each of these
intervals. Let sa denote the value of sc (c) on the interval [Γa+1,Γa). Then,
sa =
S (Γa)− S (Γa+1)
Γa − Γa+1 =
pa
Γa − Γa+1 .
Substituting this in (19), we can write
h = wR − b (1− pip0)−
A∑
a=1
ˆ Γa
Γa+1
(
1
r + δ
ζa − ca
)
pa
Γa − Γa+1dc,
which after calculation of the integral and substitution of (9) reduces to
h = wR − 1
r + δ
A∑
a=1
pa
(
ζa − 1
2
a (ζa+1 − ζa−1)
)
− b
(
1− pip0 − 1
2
pip1
)
,
where we define ζA+1 = ζA to simplify notation.
B General Search Cost Functions
Individual Rationality. It may seem that little can be said about a worker’s search cost
function as we only have one observation of the number of applications that he sends. However,
individual rationality imposes considerable structure. To see this, denote by C (a|a∗) the search
cost function of a worker, conditional on this worker sending a∗ applications in equilibrium. As
an example, let the worker send a∗ = 2 applications in equilibrium at a cost C2 ≡ C (2|2). A
number of observations can then be made. First, C2 ≤ Γ1 + Γ2 or otherwise the worker would
have been better off not applying. Second, C (1|2) ≥ C2 − Γ2 or otherwise the worker would
have been better off applying once. Likewise, C (a|2) ≥ C2 +
∑a
j=3 Γa for all a ∈ {3, . . . , A}
or otherwise the worker would have been better off applying a times. Finally, the assumption
that C (·) is weakly increasing implies that C (1|2) ≤ C2. Figure 3 illustrates these restrictions.
Bounds. As we do not observe the worker’s exact value of C2, we again construct bounds.
The lowest search costs are obtained if C2 = 0 and C (a|2) follows the lower boundary of the
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Figure 3: Feasible Search Cost Functions
Red area: set of feasible search cost functions C (a|2) for a worker who sends two appli-
cations in equilibrium at cost C2.
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Figure 4: Bounds on Search Cost Functions
Red lines: upper bound and lower bound of feasible search cost functions for a worker
who sends two applications in equilibrium. Blue area: linear search cost functions used in
baseline model.
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set indicated in figure 3. The highest search costs are obtained if C2 = Γ1 + Γ2 and C (a|2)
follows the upper boundary of this set. Figure 4 plots these bounds, together with the linear
search cost functions used in the baseline model. Similar bounds can be obtained for workers
who send a∗ 6= 2 applications in equilibrium.24
Home Production. By imposing either the upper bound or the lower bound of the search
costs functions instead of the linear ones, we change the option value of continued search,
which results in a different value for the value of home production h.25 To see this, note that
a worker’s reservation wage equation now equals
wR = h+
A∑
a∗=0
pa∗
(
B (a∗) +
1
r + δ
ζa∗ − C (a∗|a∗)
)
. (8′)
24Note that, unlike in the linear case, we cannot rule out that a worker who sends 10 applications in
equilibrium would pay more for sending 5 applications than a worker who actually sent 5 applications.
25This was not the case above, when we changed the search costs of workers sending zero applications. As
they did not actually incur these costs, the option value remained unchanged.
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The lower bound implies C (a∗|a∗) = 0 for all a∗. Hence,
h = wR − b (1− pip0)− 1
r + δ
A∑
a∗=0
pa∗ζa∗ ,
which yields h = −0.202. When workers incur the maximum possible search costs ∑a∗i=1 Γi in
equilibrium, we get h = wR − (1− pi) b, which implies h = 0.320.
Planner’s Results. We let the planner take the new values for h into account when de-
termining his solution for either of the bounds.26 Table 4 presents the results. For the lower
bound on the search costs, the planner wants all workers to search exactly once. This resem-
bles the solution in table 3, when we only relaxed the search costs of the workers who did not
apply. The welfare gain is 8.0% for the constrained planner and 13.6% for the unconstrained
planner, which—perhaps somewhat surprisingly—is a bit lower than in the baseline case. The
explanation for this lies in the fact that h is considerably lower now, which is a countervailing
force against the reduction in the search costs in the calculation of surplus.
The results for the upper bound on the search costs differ a bit more from table 3. In
particular, the planner wants more workers to abstain from searching. The reason is simple.
As we are considering the upper bound, workers who sent many (say, a∗) applications in
equilibrium have a high search cost,
∑a∗
i=1 Γi, even for applying once. This cost exceeds the
social benefit of applying, so it is better to let these workers not search at all. We find that
the cutoff is around a∗ = 6. That is, the workers who sent a∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6} applications
in equilibrium—roughly half of all workers—should apply once, while the workers who sent
a∗ ∈ {0, 7, 8, . . . , A} applications in equilibrium should not search. The welfare gain is 6.4%
for the constrained planner and 12.8% for the unconstrained planner—the higher search costs
are now mitigated by the corresponding increase in h.
26Note that the change in h does not affect market surplus, since—by construction—it is exactly offset by
the change in expected search costs in equilibrium.
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Table 4: Planner’s Solution for Non-Linear Search Cost Functions
Constrained Planner Unconstrained Planner
Max Costs Baseline Min Costs Max Costs Baseline Min Costs
p0 0.471 0.000 0.000 0.471 0.000 0.000
p1 0.529 1.000 1.000 0.529 1.000 1.000
p2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p≥5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
θ 0.218 0.347 0.381 0.529 1.000 1.000
u 0.071 0.045 0.041 0.028 0.015 0.015
v 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015
mW 0.199 0.328 0.353 0.529 1.000 1.000
mF 0.912 0.944 0.928 1.000 1.000 1.000
h 0.320 0.220 -0.202 0.320 0.220 -0.202
Output 95.24 98.26 96.76 101.02 102.25 101.72
Gain 6.4% 9.7% 8.0% 12.8% 14.2% 13.6%
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